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ST ATE OF OHIO 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY 
ALAN DA VIS, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 














IN THE COURT COMMON PLEAS 
CASE NO. 312322 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
REGARDING ADMISSION OF 
TESTIMONY FROM 1954 TRIAL 
Plaintiff, the Estate of Samuel H. Sheppard, has moved this Court, in limine, to preclude 
Defendant, the State of Ohio, from introducing into evidence at trial any testimony of unavailable 
witnesses given at the 1954 trial of State v. Sheppard. For the reasons set forth below, as well as 
those stated at bar, 1 the motion is DENIED. 
Background 
In 1966 the United States Supreme Court, inSheppardv. Maxwell (1966), 384 U.S. 333, held 
that Samuel H. Sheppard's original trial in 1954 constituted a denial of due process as a result of 
pervasive publicity which infected the trial proceedings. Plaintiff now argues that the Supreme 
Court's holding also requires this Court to exclude any of the testimony from that trial in the case 
sub Judice. Plaintiff argues that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, see generally, Wong Sun 
v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, compels such a decision. 
The State contends that the testimony is admissible hearsay of unavailable declarants and thus 
1 The Court's ruling was announced in open court on February 4, 2000. A ruling on a 
motion in limine is necessarily provisional. The Court believes it appropriate to provide this 
additional insight into its rationale in order to enable the parties to fully address the Court's concerns 
should, as the Court expects, the motion be revisited at trial. 
-admissible pursuant to Oh. R. Evid. 804(B)(l ). The State further contends that the exclusionary rule 
and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are inapplicable in civil cases. 
Analysis 
1. Rule of Evidence 804(B)(l) 
There is no dispute that the 1954 testimony which Defendant intends to offer is, at least to 
some extent, relevant. 2 Because the testimony constitutes out of court statements being offered, in 
at least some instances, for the truth of the matters asserted, and because the testimony does not fall 
under Evidence Rule 801(D)'s definition of statements which are not hearsay,3 some or all of the 
anticipated testimony is hearsay. Evidence Rule 804(B)(l) provides for the admission of prior 
testimony at a proceeding of a now unavailable witness when: 
the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil 
action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect 
examination. 
When the testimony was taken at the 1954 trial, Samuel H. Sheppard had the opportunity to cross 
examine the witnesses and a motive similar to Plaintiffs motive in the instant case -- to put forth 
evidence that Samuel H. Sheppard did not kill Marilyn Sheppard. Accordingly, the dictates of Rule 
804(B)(l) have been met. 
2 As discussed, infra, the Court will consider particular objections to relevance or to the 
potential for unfair prejudice that particular testimony may carry. 
3 Samuel H. Sheppard testified at the 1954 trial. However, because the Ohio Rules of 
Evidence do not except "privity admissions" from the definition of hearsay, Dr. Sheppard's 
testimony, to the extent it is being offered for its truth, is also hearsay. See, this Court's 
Memorandum Opinion of February 12, 2000 in the instant case (holding in limine that Dr. 
Sheppard's "privity admissions" at the 1954 Coroner's Inquest are hearsay). 
2. Constitutional Considerations 
With respect to the Plaintiffs argument about the exclusionary rule and the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine, these principles do not compel the exclusion of the 1954 trial testimony. 
"Generally, the exclusionary rule has not been applied in civil cases. State ex rel. Rear Door 
Bookstore v. Tenth District Court of Appeals (1992), 63 Ohio State 3d 354, 364. 
Moreover, the errors in the 1954 trial on which Sheppard v. Maxwell focused, and which 
Plaintiff argues should cause the exclusion of testimony from that trial, were errors made, in whole 
or in part, part, by the trial judge, not by the prosecutors. Normally the exclusionary rule does not 
apply to judicial errors. See generally, United States v. Leon (1984), 468 US 897, 916 ("the 
exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges 
and magistrates"). Accordingly, the Court declines Plaintiffs invitation to expand the exclusionary 
rule to the facts of this case. 
3. Scope of the Court's Ruling 
While Plaintiffs sweeping motion in limine to exclude any and all testimony from the 1954 
trial on the constitutional grounds enunciated supra is denied, this ruling in limine in no way 
addresses Plaintiffs ability to move the Court to limit testimony from the 1954 trial on additional 
evidentiary grounds. Such objections will be addressed as they are raised, on either a witness by 
witness, or question by question basis. 
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